U.S. Free Trade Agreements in East Asia:
Politics, Economics, and Security Policy in the
Bush Administration by Hoadley, Stephen
www.ssoar.info
U.S. Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: Politics,
Economics, and Security Policy in the Bush
Administration
Hoadley, Stephen
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hoadley, S. (2007). U.S. Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: Politics, Economics, and Security Policy in the Bush
Administration. Südostasien aktuell : journal of current Southeast Asian affairs, 26(1), 51-75. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-336729
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Südostasien aktuell 1/2007 51
Studie
U.S. Free Trade Agreements in East Asia:




The Bush Administration has initiated nearly two dozen bilateral and bi-multilateral free trade
agreements (FTAs) in the past six years. These FTAs are valued as not only advancing U.S. economic
interests but also serving foreign policy and security interests. Their perceived utility as new
foreign policy instruments emerged in the wake of the stagnation of multilateral trade liberalization
deliberations in the WTO forum and was ampliﬁed by the exigencies of the U.S. war on terrorism
launched in 2001. The FTA phenomenon is a manifestation of a pragmatic realist neo-mercantilist
approach. U.S. FTA initiatives in Asia are driven primarily by economic interests, but this article
points out that security interests are also signiﬁcant. An FTA with Singapore, in which security
elements were implicit alongside the explicit economic aims, was an early success. But opposition
to U.S. proposals by national actors and interest groups in Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and
other potential FTA partners is substantial and progress is slow. The resulting agreements are likely
to fall short of WTO-plus comprehensiveness, and may be marred by carve-outs and prolonged
phase-ins. U.S. employment of FTAs in Asia is best seen as an extension of familiar policy efforts
to protect or advance U.S. economic interests in a ﬂuid political-economic arena. But these FTAs
are not likely to alter the pattern of hegemony in Asia. (Manuscript received October 10, 2006;
accepted for publication December 17, 2006)1
Keywords: Free Trade Agreements, WTO, USA, economic policy, East Asia
Stephen Hoadley is Associate Professor of Political Studies at The University of Auckland. He is
author of Negotiating Free Trade: The New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement (New Zealand
Institute of International Affairs 2002), books on New Zealand trade negotiations with Australia
(1995), Taiwan (1998), and the United States (2000), and articles on free trade initiatives by China
and the Southeast Asian states, forthcoming in Paciﬁc Affairs. Contact: s.hoadley@auckland.ac.nz
1 The author would like to thank two reviewers for conscientious reading and apposite sugges-
tions on the earlier draft. The rewriting they stimulated has signiﬁcantly improved the present
version.
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Studie
US-Freihandelsabkommen in Ostasien: Politik,




In den letzten sechs Jahren hat die Bush-Regierung die Unterzeichnung von annähernd zwei Dutzend
bi- und multilateraler Freihandelsabkommen eingeleitet. Der Nutzen dieser Freihandelsabkommen
wird in der Befriedigung US-amerikanischer Wirtschaftsinteressen und außen- und sicherheitspoliti-
scher Interessen gesehen. Als neues außenpolitisches Instrument wurde ihr Nutzen insbesondere
nach der Stagnation der multilateralen Verhandlungen unter dem Dach der WTO sowie im Rahmen
des im Jahr 2001 eingeleiteten Krieges gegen den Terror erkannt. Das Phänomen der Freihandels-
abkommen ist dabei Ausdruck eines pragmatischen, realistischen neo-merkantilistischen Ansatzes.
In erster Linie sind Freihandelsabkommen Ausdruck wirtschaftlicher Interessen. Dieser Artikel
unterstreicht jedoch auch die Relevanz sicherheitspolitischer Argumente. Die US-Freihandelspolitik
ist damit eine Fortführung bekannter Politikinstrumente, US-amerikanische Wirtschaftsinteressen
in Zeiten wirtschaftlicher und politischer Unsicherheit zu schützen oder voranzubringen. Das
Machtgleichgewicht in Asien werden die Freihandelszonen jedoch nicht verändern. (Manuskript
eingereicht am 10.10.2006; zur Veröffentlichung angenommen am 17.12.2006)
Keywords: Multilaterale Freihandelsabkommen, WTO, USA, Wirtschaftspolitik, Ostasien
Stephen Hoadley ist Associate Professor an der Universität von Auckland, Neuseeland. Er hat
zahlreiche Bücher und Aufsätze zum Thema Freihandelsabkommen verfasst. Darunter fallen neben
Negotiating Free Trade: The New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement (New Zealand Institute of
International Affairs 2002) auch Monograﬁen zu den Wirtschaftsverhandlungen mit Australien
(1995), Taiwan und den USA sowie Artikel zu den Freihandelsinitiativen Chinas und der ASEAN-
Staaten (erscheinen in Paciﬁc Affairs). Kontakt: s.hoadley@auckland.ac.nz
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1 Introduction
This article is stimulated by the observation that the United States has initiated
four free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia1 since the beginning of this
decade, with more projected, whereas previously there was none (see table 1).
Furthermore the U.S. has recently forged additional trade liberalization links in
the form of Trade and Investment Facilitation Agreements with Cambodia and
ASEAN and a textile agreement with Vietnam. The Enterprise for ASEAN (EAI)
Initiative envisages a series of FTAs with all members of the ASEAN grouping
except Myanmar, and at the summit of the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation
(APEC) in Hanoi in November 2006 U.S. representatives expressed their support
for an Asia-Paciﬁc free trade zone. These initiatives deserve attention by analysts
and this article is a preliminary step in that direction.
Table 1 U.S. Trade Initiatives in Asia 2002-2006
Initiatives Dates
Singapore FTA Completed October 2002 and now in effect
Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative Signed October 2002
Thailand FTA Initiated October 2003, still under negotiation
South Korea FTA Initiated February 2006, still under
negotiation
Malaysia FTA Initiated May 2006, still under negotiation
Vietnam textile and WTO accession
agreement
Signed May 2006
Cambodia Trade and Investment Facilitation
Agreement
Signed July 2006
ASEAN Trade and Investment Facilitation
Agreement
Signed August 2006
Source: Ofﬁce of U.S. Trade Representative. Online http://www.ustr.gov (accessed 17 November
2006).
The purpose of this article is to survey the origins and issues of U.S. FTAs in
Asia and to search for clues to their motivation. To achieve this end, U.S. FTA
policies in Asia must ﬁrst be set into the context of U.S. trade policies generally,
1 For the purpose of this article East Asia or Asia for short denotes China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Japan, and South Korea and the ten Southeast Asian states. Mongolia, North Korea and eastern
Russia might be included by other analysts, but not the present author.
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then examined to see if they are unique in some way. The article argues that
U.S. trade policy has evolved from an initial emphasis of multilateral trade
agreements to now encompass regional, minilateral, and bilateral arrangements
for trade liberalization. It will show furthermore that U.S. motives, while
primarily economic, are in fact mixed, with foreign policy, security, and domestic-
political aims visible in varying degrees. In troubled parts of the world economic
pragmatism has given away to a more focused employment of FTAs by the Bush
Administration as a new policy tool in the war on terrorism and other foreign
and security objectives (Mastel 2004).
But to the question of whether the United States has singled out the Asian
region for special attention in its FTA initiatives, to pursue its war on terrorism,
for example, this article answers in the negative. FTAs with Asia have been
undertaken selectively, and remain modest in number, relative to the global
pattern. Nevertheless Washington’s FTA initiatives in Asia are signiﬁcant in both
economic and foreign policy terms. Besides stimulating liberalization of trade
and investment and administrative reform, they signal Washington’s continued
commitment to multi-faceted engagement with the Asian region. While the FTAs
may appear to critics to insinuate U.S. interests into the economic fabric of Asia,
with political implications that reinforce U.S. hegemony in the region, this essay
argues that they are in fact extensions of familiar U.S. diplomatic mechanisms
for enhancing U.S. interests in particular countries and regions. Rather than
offensive, some FTAs are in fact defensive, designed to avoid exclusion of U.S.
traders and investors from nascent preferential trade arrangements undertaken
by a variety of governments in ﬂuid negotiating arenas beyond U.S. control.
In sum, the article pursues the following objectives: ﬁrst, to familiarize the
reader with the recent energizing of U.S. FTA policy with particular reference to
East Asia; second, to survey the economic, foreign policy and security motives
that drive this new instrument in international economic relations around the
world and in East Asia, and issues that impede them; third to indicate how U.S.
FTA policies in East Asia compare with and differ from those in other parts of
the world; and fourth to reﬂect brieﬂy on the impact of U.S. FTAs on the balance
of hegemony in the East Asian region.2
2 The impact of FTAs on regionalism, trade diversion, and domestic politics are worthy topics
but not examined directly in this survey article. The reader is referred to the contribution by
Christopher Dent in this collection regarding whether bilateral FTAs will dilute efforts to construct
U.S. FTAs in East Asia 55
Theoretical Premises
This article approaches the topic of FTAs as a neo-mercantilist sub-set of realist
theory. That is, it assumes that independent states pursue security competitively
by means of economic diplomacy (among other means) designed to maximize
advantages and minimize risks and costs to the state. This pursuit entails not
only protecting politically and economically sensitive domestic enterprises but
also opening more competitive sectors to foreign trade and investment in order
to gain reciprocal opening by selected partners. This practice of pragmatic
reciprocity may produce concerted market-opening outcomes that may become
institutionalized in either international regimes or regional organizations, but
those institutional outcomes are secondary to the gaining of net advantage by the
participants. Therefore state leaders are indifferent as to the absolute merits of
international trade regimes, regional organizations, bilateral deals, or unilateral
initiatives, but rather choose pragmatically among them to maximize relative
economic and security gains. Of course the distinction between the ends and
means of states is rarely tidy, for security has several facets, and economic
security goals become entwined with military and physical security aims as well
as diplomatic status and hegemony goals. It is in this theoretical context, and
with these caveats, that U.S. FTAs in general, and U.S. FTAs in Asia in particular,
are analyzed in the passages that follow.
2 The Advent of U.S. FTAs
Motives for FTAs
The initial U.S. motive for initiating bilateral FTAs was frustration with the
slow pace of multilateral trade liberalization negotiations. After World War
II the United States encouraged the establishment of multilateral ﬁnancial and
trade institutions (Kaplan 1996). While protectionism in Congress obliged
U.S. negotiators to abandon the project of setting up of an International Trade
Asian regional economic regimes. The assessment of trade facilitation and trade diversion on
FTA partners and third countries is best conducted by economists, for example in the Schott and
Okamoto collections and the publications of the International Institute for Economics, Washington
D.C. See Schott 2004; Okamoto 2003; http://www.iia.com. More detail on the politics behind the
initiation, negotiation, and implementation of FTAs by the U.S. and speciﬁc Asian governments
may be found in the works of I. M. Destler, Vinod Aggarwal, and Christopher Dent. See Destler
2005; Aggarwal and Urata 2006; Dent 2006
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Organization (ITO) in 1947, the U.S. did back the interim measure that became
known as the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), participated
actively in nine successive GATT rounds, and implemented their provisions.
The U.S. also supported the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and has complied with its rulings, albeit with vigorous appeals of those
judgments adverse to the United States. The U.S. has negotiated a number of
sector-speciﬁc bilateral trade agreements to facilitate trade with selected partners
or in speciﬁc commodities, but for ﬁve decades devoted substantial resources to
negotiating comprehensive (save agriculture) trade liberalization in international
arenas, notably the GATT/WTO, and more recently in regional arenas, notably
the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
However, following an acrimonious GATT ministerial meeting in 1982, U.S.
Trade Representative William Brock broached the idea of free trade negotiations
with speciﬁc partners to reduce trade and investment obstacles (Schott 1983;
Schott 2004:361). Thus bilateral FTAs were conceived as a supplement, and
simultaneously as a stimulant, to the GATT process. A strategic motive also be-
came visible: the notion that favored partners could be rewarded for undertaking
policies that advanced the economic, political, security or ideological interests of
the U.S. Examples of economic FTAs included deals with Canada in 1989 and
Mexico leading to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993
(Hart 2004). Examples of FTAs with mixed economic and strategic motives
included those with Israel (1985) (Rosen 2004) and Jordan (2000) (Rosen 2004;
Bolle 2001).
Nevertheless during the two decades of the 1980s and 1990s the number of
FTAs relative to the number of America’s trading partners remained miniscule.
The reasons for this included
• U.S. optimism after the inauguration of the Uruguay Round in 1986 that
multilateral negotiations would bear fruit;
• The Clinton Administration’s hopes that APEC would produce Asia-Paciﬁc
regional liberalization;
• The depletion of President Clinton’s “political capital” by opposition from
unions, environmentalists, anti-globalists, and liberal Democrats and Clinton’s
inability to secure “fast track” trade negotiating authority;3 and
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• Republican Party legislators’ opposition to Clinton’s “liberal internationalism”
generally.
3 The Bush Administration and FTAs
FTAs Rejuvenated
Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001 the BushAdministrationwas rejuvenating
the idea of bilateral FTAs. These instruments were conceived as supplements
to regional schemes such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and
minilateral arrangements with Central America, the Andean states, and the
Southern African States (Yamada 2003). Fresh in the minds of political leaders
and the new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and his staff were
the anti-globalization demonstrations in Seattle in 1999, the miscarriage of the
Millennium Round, and the delayed start to what became the Doha Development
Round in 2001. Their doubts about multilateralism were strengthened by the
failure of the Cancun WTO ministerial of September 2003 to move the Doha
Round negotiations forward.
The Bush Administration was well aware of beneﬁts to be gained from the FTA
alternative. As stated by U.S. Trade Representative (U.S.TR) Zoellick (Zoellick
2002), the economic utility of FTAs included the following:
• U.S. FTAs could neutralize the trade diversion effects of the growing number
of preferential trade agreements negotiated by the European Union and states
in other parts of the world, notably Asia and Latin America;
• FTAs could be used to stimulate “competitive liberalization,” that is, the U.S.
could lead by example to induce other governments and the WTO negotiators
to undertake further reforms (Bergsten 1996; Schott 2004:362);
• FTAs would give U.S. goods exporters better market access and help alleviate
the negative balance in the current account;
• Speciﬁc sector-opening provisions of FTAs would help U.S. leaders in infor-
mation technology, intellectual property, and ﬁnancial services to exploit new
markets;
3 “Fast track” or Trade Promotion Authority is an agreement by the U.S. Congress to allow the
President to negotiate trade agreements and then submit them for legislative approval without
amendment, that is, Congress can either approve or disapprove the text of the agreement but
cannot amend its details.
58 Stephen Hoadley
• FTAs would secure host country legal protection for U.S. investors; and
• FTAs that increased agricultural exports could be cited as justiﬁcation for
reducing U.S. farm and export subsidies, an administration goal.
Political motives, too, were at work. President Bush explicitly rejected Clin-
ton’s “liberal internationalism” and stressed unilateral and bilateral approaches
to serving U.S. interests more directly, not least in trade negotiations. It may also
be argued that the more thoughtful of U.S. policy-makers perceived the declining
utility of U.S. “hard power”, that is, military power and nuclear arms, after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and recommended shifting the emphasis of U.S.
policy to “soft power” (Nye 2002). This included using the attractiveness of the
U.S. market and U.S. capital, rather than allegedly redundant military alliances,
to induce favorable bilateral bargains with chosen partners. It is conceivable also
that Washington took note of the diplomatic successes of the European Union in
attracting diverse partners and applied the lessons learned.
Diplomatic and Security Motives
The attacks of September 11, 2001 galvanized U.S. policy in a number of ways,
one of which was a search for allies in counter-terrorism actions abroad (Lindsay
2003). FTAs were used to strengthen and reward friendly Muslim states such
as Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, and United Arab Emirates. Willing allies such as
Singapore and Australia gained enhanced access to U.S. markets and security
cooperation by means of FTAs. Deserving partners not quite qualifying for
FTAs were rewarded with intermediate agreements called Trade and Investment
Framework Agreements (TIFAs), of which nine were negotiated after September
2001, holding out the prospect of FTAs in the future (U.S. Trade Representative
2006c).
Besides directly enhancing the war on terrorism, FTAs advanced other U.S.
foreign policy aims by sending political messages, both positive and negative
(Mastel 2004):
• FTAs requiring monitoring and enforcement of administrative standards, trans-
parency, and accountability advanced U.S. good government and democracy
aims;
• U.S. provision of technical assistance, training and collaboration to ensure
compliance deepened U.S. contacts, intelligence, engagement, and inﬂuence
in FTA partner governments;
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• The U.S. accelerated talks with Australia and Central American governments
after they backed the attack on Iraq;
• The U.S. sent a message of disapprobation to Chile by postponing FTA talks
after that government demurred on attacking Iraq;
• The U.S. isolated Cuba while pursuing FTA talks with neighboring Central
and South American states;
• Washington avoided talks with New Zealand because of a nuclear-ship-visit
disagreement and the prime minister’s criticisms of U.S. Iraq policy; and
• The U.S. avoided talks with Taiwan to avoid affronting Beijing, which was co-
operating in the war on terrorism and pressuring North Korea and displaying
moderation in its economic policies.
The link of FTAs to U.S. foreign policy is made explicit by ofﬁcial statements
and assessments. For example, U.S.TR Robert Zoellick said in 2002 that
“America’s trade policies are connected to our broader economic, political and
security aims” (Zoellick 2002:27). The U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce, a
research arm of Congress, stated in a 2004 study of the policies and actions of
the U.S.TR that “cooperation in security and foreign policy” was a signiﬁcant
criterion for choosing FTA partners (GAO 2004:8).
4 U.S. FTAs in Asia
The Asia-Paciﬁc FTA Arena
The Bush Administration’s world-wide FTA initiatives extended also to the Asian
arena (Feinberg 2006). President Bill Clinton and Singapore Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong discussed a possible FTA during a meeting in late 2000 but it fell
to incoming President Bush’s Trade Representative Zoellick to carry the idea
forward. After brisk negotiations Washington had completed its ﬁrst FTA with
an Asian state at the end of 2002 (Sen 2004:43). Talks with Thailand began
the following year. After lengthy preliminaries, talks were formally initiated
with South Korea and Malaysia in 2006. Talks with the regional grouping
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or individual Southeast Asian
states were foreshadowed within the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI)
framework announced in October 2002. The U.S. has already negotiated TIFAs
with Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia and the
Philippines (U.S.TR 2006c; Fergusson and Sek 2005). The following passages
review the motives and modalities of U.S. FTAs with Singapore, Thailand, South
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Korea, and Malaysia and reﬂect on other FTAs with Asian partners that could
follow in future.
Singapore
U.S. motives in agreeing to FTA talks with Singapore were primarily economic
but not without a signiﬁcant strategic element as well. In 2000 Singapore was
Washington’s eleventh most valuable trade partner and regarded as an entry-point
into the markets of the Southeast Asian region. U.S. investment in Singapore
exceeded USD 30 billion and over 1,500 U.S. ﬁrms operated in the city-state.
Singapore was the second most vigorous investor in the U.S., after Japan (Koh
2004:8). Furthermore, Singapore’s economy was the most liberal of all Asian
countries, and its government was the cleanest and most efﬁcient as evidenced
by Singapore’s excellent ranking in the Transparency International Corruption
Index. And Singapore had just completed FTA negotiations with New Zealand
and her trade diplomats were thus experienced and ready to negotiate (Hoadley
2002; Lee 2006).
Because Singapore had no agricultural exports to threaten the U.S. farm
lobby, negotiations based on the U.S.-Jordan FTA model proceeded quickly. The
subsequent agreement was regarded by both sides as a new precedent of high
quality despite the omission of the normally thorny issue of agricultural access.
Besides eliminating tariffs on goods and services the agreement was lauded by the
U.S. as advancing intellectual property protection, enhancing transparency and
customs cooperation, and providing new ways to handle environment and labor
disputes. The agreement was hailed also as a practical step towards realization
of the APEC and EAI visions, and a precedent for further bilateral talks in Asia
(Nanto 2003:10-11).
Regarding security motives, it should be noted that Singapore made available
port and air base facilities to U.S. naval and air forces and in other ways cooperated
with the U.S. military. Certainly security was an element in the Singapore chief
negotiator’s mind. As Ambassador Tommy Koh later stated,
Singapore’s interest in the U.S., however, transcends business and
economics. Singapore wishes to entrench the presence of the U.S. in the
region because it underpins the security of the whole Asia-Paciﬁc region.
Singapore regards the U.S.-Singapore FTA as a symbol of continued U.S.
commitment to the region [ . . . ] the USSFTA [ . . . ] is about enhancing the
prospects of peace and stability in the region (Koh 2004:8).
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Thailand
While not a major trading partner for the U.S., ranking only twentieth in value,
Washington had substantial interests in initiating FTA talks with Thailand in 2003
(USTR 2005; Ahearn and Morrison 2005). In the economic sphere Washington’s
aims were to
• Reduce Thailand’s tariff on agriculture goods from its current level of approx-
imately 35 percent;
• Improve access for exporters of industrial goods and telecommunications,
ﬁnancial, and legal services;
• Reduce non-transparent and non-tariff barriers for example in sanitary and
phytosanitary measures;
• Liberalize investment, both FDI and portfolio, and set up arbitration mecha-
nisms to allow investors to seek redress directly;
• Strengthen intellectual property and patent enforcement and reduce IT piracy;
• Raise labor and environmental standards; and
• Facilitate trade through technical assistance and joint working groups.
As well, corollary diplomatic and strategic beneﬁts may accrue in a U.S.-
Thai FTA. The U.S. has a long-standing security relationship with Thailand.
Since 1954 they have been partners in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO) and the bilateral Rusk-Thanat accord (1962). Thailand’s air bases were
hosts to the U.S. Air Force during the Vietnam War. Although these links had
attenuated by the mid-1970s, military cooperation continued, and at present
Cobra Gold remains the U.S. military’s largest annual exercise in Asia. President
Bush was forthright in his backing of Prime Minister Thaksin for his robust
defense and counter-terrorism policies as well as for his economic liberalization
aims. The U.S.TR webpage on the U.S.-Thai talks states that “an FTA also would
strengthen longstanding economic and security ties between our countries”
(USTR 2006d). A Congressional Research Service report states that the FTA
with Thailand, as part of the US EAI, “is also seen [by the Administration, S.H.]
as a way of countering growing Chinese inﬂuence in the region” (Fergusson and
Sek 2005:12).
However, the U.S. is impeded in its negotiations by elements of dualism and
underdevelopment that persist in the Thai economy (Parnwell 1996; Muscat
1994). Finance, services, and some manufacturing and commodity production are
only partially liberalized and signiﬁcant sectors are distorted by overt or indirect
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government control and manipulation by Bangkok magnates (Laothamatas 1992;
MacIntyre 1990). Uneasiness remains among U.S. investors over a possible return
to investment and currency instability as experience during the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis, and possible Thai retreat from liberalization in the post-Thaksin period
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1998; World Trade Organization 2003; Warr 2005).
But the willingness Thailand’s leaders to engage in FTA talks is not generally
at issue (Kiyota 2006). Since the 1990s Bangkok has pursued an enthusiastic
course of trade talks, rivaling Singapore as Asia’s FTA leader, and now has a total
of fourteen bilateral and three minilateral FTA partners signed up or in prospect
(Nagai 2002, 2003, 2004; Chirathivat and Mallikamas 2004). Criticism has
been leveled at the Thai government not for lack of internationalism but rather
for failing at home to rationalize and consolidate existing FTAs and carry out
obligated ﬁnancial and administrative reforms before embarking on new FTAs
(Sally 2005).
But with regard to speciﬁc issues embedded in the FTA, objections have
been raised by the Thai government negotiators and the local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) (Choudry 2004). Thai spokespeople allege that
• The prospective FTA will require legal changes and will lead to extensive
foreign ownership of land, thus infringe Thai sovereignty (Maneerungsee
2005);
• Foreign capital may take over the newly privatized Thai corporations, elimi-
nating government subsidies, raising prices, and cutting jobs;
• U.S.-subsidized and GE foods will ﬂood the Thai market and drive out small
farmers;
• Intellectual property rules will allegedly stop Thai government distribution of
cheap anti-HIV/AIDS drugs, prevent local labeling of Thai silk and jasmine
rice, and speed up what the critics call “bio-piracy” by foreign corporations;
• The U.S. Congress will oblige the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate
agricultural carve-outs and long phase-ins, as happened in the U.S.-Australia
FTA, which will reduce the beneﬁts of the deal to Thailand (Buckman 2003;
Chrispin and Hiebert 2004); and
• Deeper U.S. ties with Bangkok will worsen tensions in the Muslim south and
isolate Thailand from its Asian neighbors, especially pro-Muslim Malaysia.
As a consequence of this dissent, and also because of the political stalemate
in Bangkok following the last election, negotiations have proved difﬁcult, and
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completion of the FTA is not expected until 2007 at the earliest.4
South Korea
The U.S. has very substantial economic links with South Korea, which is its
seventh most valuable trade partner (Choi and Schott 2004:175). For the U.S.,
a FTA would improve market access, facilitate investment, promote economic
restructuring, potentially enhance growth and stability on the Korean Peninsula,
and set a liberalizing precedent for Japan and other Asian governments. It would
also counter trade diversion engendered by the Korea-ASEAN FTA. For Korea
it would provide access to one of its biggest markets and offset trade diversion
caused by NAFTA (Choi and Schott 2001; Min 2006; Schott, Bradford, and
Moll 2006) The FTA would also reinforce security ties. U.S. security interests
in that country have their roots in the Korean War period and 35,000 U.S.
troops continue to be deployed to deter North Korea from renewed attacks.
Nevertheless the South Korean economy is developed and complex and politics
are pluralistic and increasingly nationalistic. Consequently FTA talks are proving
difﬁcult for Washington. From the U.S. perspective (USTR 2006b), issues
impeding negotiations include:
• Agricultural protectionism, especially in rice and beef;
• Industrial protection, especially in the auto industry (Odessey 2006);
• Barriers imposed by, or privileges reserved for, the state-directed monopolies
(chaebol);
• State pharmaceutical pricing subsidies;
• The “buy Korea” policies that impede “national treatment” in government
procurement and foster a general bias against U.S. imports;
• The prospect of Korean inexpensive steel exports triggering U.S. anti-dumping
or safeguard policy mechanisms; and
• Dilemmas surrounding the eligibility of products of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex, ﬁnanced and managed by South Korean ﬁrms but located in North
Korea.
Furthermore, the rising climate of nationalism and growing anti-Americanism
in the public, especially students, makes the South Korean government reluctant
4 See “Thailand suspends U.S. free trade talks due to poll”, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.
php3?id_article=3973 (accessed on 17 March 2006). The September 19, 2006 coup by the Army
will doubtless cause further delays.
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to expose itself to criticism by making concessions to U.S. negotiators. And
the government in Seoul is increasingly interested in negotiating an FTA with
ASEAN and otherwise working with the deepening Asian economic network.
While negotiations will continue and small advances will be achieved, prospects
for completion of an FTA with the U.S. in the near term are dim.
Malaysia
U.S. interests in a FTA with Malaysia are primarily economic but also include a
nascent strategic element. Malaysia is the tenth most valuable trade partner for
the U.S. and the host of much U.S. capital, particularly in the electronics and IT
industries. A primary U.S. aim is to avoid Malaysian tariffs, which are four times
higher than U.S. tariffs, thereby doubling U.S. manufacturing and agricultural
exports, according to an ofﬁcial estimate (USTR 2006a).
The U.S. hopes to reduce Malaysian protection of its automobile industry
and alter the government procurement preference for bumiputra (native Malay)
enterprises. Facilitation of investment would enable U.S. high-tech, telecommu-
nications, and ﬁnancial services ﬁrms to gain a stronger foothold. U.S. ﬁrms
importing Malaysian materials and sub-components could reduce costs and the
same advantages would accrue to Malaysian ﬁrms importing U.S. components.
Wider U.S. goals include using Malaysia as a gateway to the nascent ASEAN
free trade area markets, setting a faster pace for economic partnerships in the
region, advancing President Bush’s Enterprise in ASEAN Initiative, and stimulat-
ing economic restructuring, reform, and rule-base competition (LaFleur 2006).
Furthermore, U.S. ofﬁcials, noting strategic convergence, joint military training
and Malaysian purchase of American weapons and defense equipment, stress
that an FTA would “support our partnership on security [and] in the war on
terror” (USTR 2006a).
Talks with Malaysia are at an early phase and are likely to be protracted and
arduous from the U.S. point of view. While Malaysia is a moderate Muslim
state with a moderately well-developed economy, a potentially useful partner to
neighboring Singapore and Thailand, and a leading proponent of ASEAN, it is
also a state whose leaders have displayed scepticism of the west in general and the
United States in particular. The new Prime Minister Badawi is more cosmopolitan
than his predecessor Mohamad Mahathir but he has reappointed Raﬁdah Aziz as
Trade Minister. She and her staff are expected to retain their biases in favor of
ASEAN regional free trade cooperation in preference to bilateral FTAs (Suzuki
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2003; Okamoto 2005). In fact, Malaysia has long resisted the bilateral FTAs and
at an early stage severely criticized Singapore for surging ahead with bilateral
FTAs. Nevertheless, in 2005 Raﬁdah Aziz announced that Malaysia would be
undertaking FTA talks with the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, and
Pakistan (Raﬁda Aziz 2005). This change of course appeared motivated more by
anxiety about being left out of preferential trade areas than by innate enthusiasm
for the FTA concept.
This reluctance aside, long-standing Malaysian economic structure and policy
peculiarities present several formidable obstacles to an FTA with the United
States. These include:
• Substantial Malaysian state ownership or regulation of banks and major
enterprises;
• Barriers to national treatment in government procurement;
• Open and hidden subsidies;
• Overt industrial protectionism in the auto industry; and
• Bumiputra (Malay preference) investment, ownership, and employment poli-
cies (Odessey 2006).
High-level corruption and the phenomenon known as “crony capitalism”
also characterize the commanding heights of the Malaysian economy (Gomez
1999). During the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, Malaysia was unique in Asia in restricting
currency convertibility (Nesadurai 2000). These features, which will not be
readily surrendered, do not bode well for U.S. negotiators.
Taiwan and other Asian FTAs
No other FTA in Asia is on the current agenda, and in light of the heavy
work-load borne by the U.S.TR and her staff, none is likely to be undertaken
until current talks with Korea, Thailand and Malaysia and other countries
around the world are nearer to completion. President Bush’s “fast track” Trade
Promotion Authority will expire in June 2007 and soon thereafter the 2008
presidential election campaign will begin, during which U.S. policy initiatives tend
to pause. The Republic of China on Taiwan has been pressing the Washington
to enter into FTA talks, and many beneﬁts would accrue to both economies
from a comprehensive liberalization agreement. Taiwan is the U.S.’s eighth most
valuable trade partner and the source, and host, of much trans-Paciﬁc capital
investment, tourism, and educational exchange (Lardy and Rosen 2004:199).
But U.S.TR capacity and cross-strait political sensitivities aside, policy differences
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would make negotiations difﬁcult. The U.S.-Taiwan Business Council has detailed
eight issues that the ROC government must address prior to beginning FTA talks,
including insufﬁcient ﬁnancial institution reform, intellectual property protection,
and anticorruption efforts, rice import quotas, unfair labeling requirements, and
protectionism in telecommunications, health care, and pharmaceuticals (Lardy
and Rosen 2004:200).
To conclude this section one might note obstacles to future FTA talks with
six other Asia states. These include the following:
• China’s large state sector, corruption, currency manipulation, and massive
potential for US industry-threatening low-cost exports;
• Japan’s non-tariff barriers to investment and imports, e.g. hyper-standards,
subtle administrative subsidies and protection of manufacturing, ﬁnancial and
service industries, and rice quotas;
• Indonesia’s corruption, dual economy, and traditional protectionist and
pribumi (pro-native Indonesian) policies; and
• Vietnam’s large state sector, regulatory opacity, poor intellectual property
protection, weak infrastructure, and corruption.
• India and Pakistan exhibit all the above difﬁculties and in addition may be
too big, too complex and too threatening for U.S. negotiators to persuade
Congress and the economic interests of America to accept. Further, it would
be politically awkward to begin FTA talks with one without including the
other, given their rivalry, and both simultaneously would be indigestible.
However, as a preliminary to FTAs, or as a politically mollifying interim
substitute, the U.S. could negotiate Trade and Investment Framework Agreements,
Bilateral Investment Treaties, and other more limited instruments to address
speciﬁc bilateral issues and facilitate economic relations. Such agreements were
concluded with Cambodia, Vietnam, and the ASEAN grouping in 2006 (see
table 1). Along with membership in the WTO, these agreements are seen by
Washington as prerequisites to comprehensive FTA negotiations.
5 Aims and implications of FTAs summarized
The foregoing survey of recent U.S. FTA policies during the Bush Administration
supports four general observations on the aims of U.S. FTAs in Asia.
First, U.S. FTAs in Asia are conceived primarily as trade liberalization in-
struments, providing easier access for U.S. products, services, and capital. The
caveat below aside, this characterization differentiates U.S. FTAs in Asia from
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those in the Middle East, where strategic motives appear to predominate, and
in Latin America where historical sphere of inﬂuence practices continue to cast
their shadows.
Second, U.S. FTAs are also seen as change agents, comprehensive devices
to spur liberalization of a wide range of economic relations including services,
investment, intellectual property, standards setting and recognition, and customs
facilitation. They also serve to stimulate behind-the-border changes in economic
structures and practices in the partner countries.
Third, U.S. FTAs are designed to stimulate further FTAs and minilateral,
regional, and multilateral liberalization as well, in short to constitute building
blocks in a wider process of economic liberalization world-wide. Whether that
process is institutionalized by the WTO, APEC, or small regional bodies is yet to
become clear, and Washington is keeping all options open.
Fourth, FTAs are seen by U.S. leaders to have foreign policy and security
implications, reinforcing common endeavors previously arising out of the Cold
War, now arising out of the war on terrorism, efforts to counter insurgency,
piracy, or crime, and policies to underpin regional stability. With regard to
the latter, American realist analysts perceive recent Chinese FTA initiatives in
Southeast Asia as foreshadowing the growth of hegemony (benign so far) by China
(Hoadley and Yang forthcoming). U.S. FTAs are therefore useful supplements
to policies that would moderate Chinese hegemony by strengthening ties with
allies and friends of the U.S. in the region. FTAs are a non-confrontational form
of inﬂuence-balancing. Furthermore, President Bush’s call at the Hanoi APEC
summit in November 2006 to work towards an APEC free trade agreement may
be seen in this strategic light, as assuring Asian governments that they have an
alternative to an ASEAN Plus Three that is likely to be dominated by China, and
that the U.S. will continue to exercise its stabilizing role in the region.5
5 Evidence that Asian leaders may concur is found in the 2005 East Asia Summit’s invitation
to India, Australia, and New Zealand to participate and in recent FTAs with those extra-regional
states. An Indonesian strategic analyst recently conﬁrmed to this author that “balancing” and “di-
luting” the growing inﬂuence of China by welcoming outside participants, and also strengthening
the ASEAN Secretariat, were elements in Southeast Asians’ approach to accommodating China in
the region without Chinese domination.
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Obstacles and compromises
However, U.S. proposals for FTAs are meeting resistance by nationalist leaders
and NGOs in Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia. U.S. aspirations for pro-
gressive FTAs, albeit shaped to accommodate U.S. neo-mercantilist politics, are
clashing with local politics and anti-globalization values. The resulting agree-
ments are likely to be less tidy than the U.S.-Singapore model FTA and fall short
of the WTO-plus aspiration. Either they will be compromised by exclusion or
deferral of sensitive issues and enervated by long phase-in periods, or negotiations
will stall. It is doubtful that U.S. negotiators, weakened by President Bush’s loss
of fast track authority and lame duck status, can impose their template on their
Asian partners, and will have to choose between ﬂawed FTAs or no agreements
at all. The same will be true of the Asian negotiators in the face of resistance
by the U.S. Congress, dominated by the Democratic Party with its free-trade
skeptics, to concessions detrimental to the interests of U.S. enterprises.
Impact on hegemony
Outside the immediate focus of this article but related to it by this article’s
acknowledgement of the realist neo-mercantilist aims of FTAs is the question
of whether these new FTAs will alter the balance of hegemony in Asia in favor
of the United States. Critics perceive U.S. FTAs as intrusive, disruptive, and
threatening not only to the economically vulnerable sectors of society but also
to the sovereign prerogatives of the partner governments. Critics also point out
that bilateral hub-and-spokes deals give Washington unequal inﬂuence inasmuch
as the U.S. can “cherry-pick” (select and shape) FTA elements with qualiﬁcations,
exceptions, phase-ins and deferrals to its own advantage. The U.S. will always
beneﬁt more than its partners, or refuse to play. And U.S. FTAs will dilute Asian
regional cooperation initiatives, so U.S. power and hegemony in Asia will grow,
to the disadvantage of all other countries, critics allege.
On the other hand, it is also true that the prospective partners can also refuse
to play. In Asia they have alternatives in the recent bilateral and minilateral deals
offered by China, Korea, Japan, and ASEAN and by outside players including the
European Union, Australia, New Zealand, and India. FTAs may become building
blocks to regional cooperation, allowing Asian states as a group to face North
America and Europe with greater equality. Furthermore, FTAs give partners
new access, resources, and access to U.S. decision-makers and a platform for
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negotiating improvements over time. FTAs bind the United States, too, and most
FTAs make explicit reference to WTO standards, so underpin the rules-based
regime that small states favor. To this extent FTAs contribute to the entrenchment
of rules that can curb the arbitrary exercise of power and facilitate international
trade policy cooperation. If this cooperation is not exactly equal or fair, at least
it is less asymmetric and less unfair than colonialism or unrestrained economic
warfare, and offers the prospect of orderly improvement over time.
6 Conclusion
This author is sceptical of assertions that the recent proliferation of U.S. FTAs
will enhance U.S. hegemony in Asia. Many other forces – diplomatic, military,
technical, and environmental – are in play that will determine the future of U.S.
hegemony. The rise of China and India, the recovery of Japan, the collective
leadership of the Southeast Asian states, and the impact of international insti-
tutions, enterprises, and NGOs on the Asian political economy will all play a
role alongside U.S. inﬂuence in the region. FTAs should be acknowledged as a
new foreign economic policy tool available to all players as an extension of their
traditional economic diplomacy. They can be advantageous to governments and
enterprises that devise and employ them skillfully, in Asia as elsewhere (CBO
2003). They will be perceived as threatening by ideological critics of economic
liberalization and groups vulnerable to economic change. But change in trading
patterns is inevitable as a consequence of globalization whether or not states
negotiate FTAs. And FTAs offer the prospect of making more explicit the rules
by which partner governments, including those of the U.S. and Asia, will play, the
concessions they have to make, and the beneﬁts that they can expect to gain. To
the extent that FTAs enhance transparency and encourage economic cooperation,
they can modulate the effects of realist neo-mercantilism.
Finally, as suggested above, Washington’s FTAs initiatives are designed not
to increase U.S. inﬂuence but rather to maintain U.S. economic access in the
face of the proliferation of Asian FTAs and diplomatic and strategic inﬂuence
in response to China’s emerging bid for regional leadership. If successful, this
policy could stabilize Asian regional relations to the beneﬁt of all actors.
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